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inventors could then afford to put their patents into saleable shape,
and wealth is not the soil in which true invention flourishes.
When we stop for a moment to reflect, we must be convinced
that our magnificent material prosperity, as a nation, is owing
very largely, more than to any other cause, to the prolific inventive genius of our people.
The best impression we could possibly put upon our national
coat-of-arms would be a pencil, hammer, and drill; for mainly by
the aid of thete and their kin have we made our great nation what
it is in material prosperity.
The true way to better ourselves in patent matters is not to
iadically change the law, but to make the examinations under it
more strict, searching, and accurate.
There can be little doubt that it is possible to so perfect these
examinations that ninety per cent. of all patents granted shall be
novel; and when we reach this point, we shall be carrying out
the law more perfectly than any other law was ever executed.
We shall make patents still more valuable than they are, foster
still- more our native genius for inv'ention, and our country will
grow and prosper in proportion.
W. E. S.
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Supreme Court of Vermont, January Term 1869.
JAMES SHEEHY v. JOHN ADARENE.
Where a'verbal contract is to be performed within a year by one party, but not
by the other, the question whether the Statute of Frauds applies or not depends on
whether the suit is brought against the party who was to perform his part within
the year. If it is so brought, the statute would not apply, but if brought against
the party whose agreement was not to be performed within the year, then the
statute would be a bar.

ON the 19th of March 1864 the parties made a verbal contract
by which the defendant agreed to furnish the plaintiff, on the 1st
day of April next following, or within a short time thereafter, a
cow for the use of the plaintiff, or forty dollars in money with
which to purchase a cow, and that the plaintiff was to have the
use of said cow for the period of one year from said 1st day of
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April, and that the plaintiff, at the end of the year, was to have
the privilege of electing either to purchase the cow by paying
forty dollars in money and one year's interest on that sum for
her, or to pay a reasonable sum for her use for that year; the cow
to be the property of the defendant until the end of that year.
The plaintiff made proper and reasonable demand of the defendant
to furnish the cow, but the defendant refused to do so.
This is assumysit to recover damage for the breach of said contract. No question was made in the county court as to the sufficiency of the consideration for said contract. The only point
made by the defendant was, that, as the contract was verbal, and
executory on both sides, and the plaintiff's part not to be performed till after the lapse of more than a year, the action could
not be maintained. Upon t6iis point the court held that it could
be maintained, and a verdict and judgment were rendered for
plaintiff. To this ruling the defendant excepted.
Ballard,for defendant, cited Gen. St., cap. 66, J 1; Squire v.
Whipple, I Vt. 69; Ninkley v. Southgate, 11 Id. 428; Peirce v.
Estate of Paine,28 Id. 34; Boydell v. Drummond,11 East 159 ;
Foot et al. v. Emerson, 10 Vt. 342; 20 Me. .122; Peter v. Compton, I Sm. Lead. Cas. 539-541; Broadwell v. Gitman, 2 Denio
87; Cabot v. Haskins, 3 Pick. 83; Lockwovd v. Barns, 3 Hill
131; Browne on Frauds, § 286.
Wilbur, for plaintiff, cited 3 Vt. 290; 23 Id. 497; 28 Id. 358;
Browne on Frauds, § 403-4, § 135; 6 Vt. 69; Id. 383; 14 Id.
446; 24 Id. 606; 29 Id. 510;.28 Id. 84; 20 Ind. 24; 33 N.
H. 239; 6 Rich. 14; 10 Me. 31; 1 Kelly 340-8; 4 Md. 476-8;
3 B. & Ad. 899; 2 0. B. N. S. 66; 2 0. B. 808; 7 Ala. 161;
1 .Root 142; Id. 479; Chit. on Cont. 68-9; 26 Penna. 327; 81
Id. 322; Id. 528; 83 Id. 169; 46 Id. 504; 85 Id. 308.
Opinion of the court by
J.-Our statute is that "no acti6n shall be brought
upon any agreement not to be performed within a year from the
making thereof, unless," &c. In this case, what the defendant
undertook to do, was to be done entirely and completely within a
month or so after the making of the contract.' The things to be
done by the plaintiff' were not to be done till more than a year
from the making of said contract. If the plaintiff had broken the
BARRETZ
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contract, the case of Pe,"I-e, v. Estate of Paine, 28 Vt. 34, would
seem to be direct that an action for such breach could not be
maintained against him. Can this action be maintained against
the defendant for the breach of the contract committed by him?
It is to be premised, that, in this case, a fact is lacking that has
existed and been named, and perhaps regarded as more or less
important, in some of the reported cases, and in the discussions
of authors and commentators upon the subject, viz. : performance
by the plaintiff -of the contract on his part, for in this case the
plaintiff had nothing to do till the defendant had performed on
his part by furnishing the cow or the money, and the plaintiff had
kept the cow through the designated year. If, therefore, the
defendant is to be held liable in this action, it must be by the
vigor of the contract, and not by reason of benefit received and
enjoyed by him resulting from performance of the contract on the
part of the plaintiff.
The only point of exception is raised upon the fact that, by the
terms of the contract, "the plaintiff was not to perform his part
of it until after a period of more than a year had elapsed from
the making of it." In the hill of exceptions it is also said that
"cno question was made as to the sufficiency of the consideration
of the cow contract ;" and, in this court, counsel have treated the
defendant's agreement as valid in every respect, and enforceable,
provided it does not fall within the operation of the statute above
cited. We treat it in the same way, and also confine the decision
to the ground and point of exception.
It is conclusively settled by the decided cases in this state that
the agreement signified by the clause of the statutes above quoted
must be capable of being completely performed within the prescribed year: Squires v. WMple, 1 Vt. 69; Hinkly v. Southgate,
11 Id. 428; Foote & Stone v. Emerson, 10 Id. 342. -It is
claimed by the defendant that "the term ' agreement,' as used in
the statute, must be construed as meaning and including what is
to be done by both parties." This claim presents the hinge-point
of the case. In the famous case of lFain v. JTarlters, 5 East 10,
it was held that the word agreement, in its application to the'
clause of the Statute of Frauds as to the specialpromiseto answet
for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another, requires the consideration, as well as the promise of the party sought to be
charged, to be in writing. After various expressions of surprise,
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and voluminous criticisms by English judges and lawyers, and
some almost contrary decisions, the Court of King's Bench, ABBOTT, 0. J., BAYLEY, HOLIROYD, and BEST, JJ., deliberately sanctioned, and directly applied, the doctrine of that case, in the year
1821, in Saunders v. Wakefield, 4 B. & Ald. 595. The varied
fortunes of the law of that case, both in England and America,
are shown with learned and painful elaboration by PARKER, C. J.,
and the decision disapproved in the same year, 1821, in the case
of -Packardv. Bicharson et al., 17 Mass. Rep. 122. In Day's
Edition (1817) of East's Reports is also a very learned, acute, and
.exhaustive note furnished by Judge SWIFT, and enlarged by the
editor, disapproving that decision. The subject is brought down
to a very recent date in thQ last edition of Smith's Lead. Cas.,
and it appears that the doctrine of Wain v. Warlters, is now the
established law of the point in Westminster Hall. Our own court
has had occasion to administer a similar statute. At the time
Smith v. Ide, 3 Vt. 290, arose and was decided, our Statute of
Frauds was as follows: "Se e . 1. That no suit in law or equity
shall be brought or maintained upon any contract or agreement
hereafter to be made, whereby to charge any executor, &c., * *
or whereby to charge the defendant upon any special promise to
answer for the debt, or default, or miscarriage of another person; * * or upon any agreement that is not to be performed
within the space of one year from the making thereof, unless the
contract or agreement upon which such action shall be brought,'
&c. This obviously contemplates an action upon a contract or
agreementwhereby to charge"the defendant upon a special promise
-that is, a suit brought upon the whole contract or agreement in
which the defendant's special promise was embraced and was
obligatory upon him. That mode of using those terms certainly
indicates as wide a scope for the term "cagreement' as the use
of the same terms (omitting the word "1contract") in the corresponding clauses of the 29 Car. I., which are, "No action shall
be brought whereby to charge the defendant upon any special
promRe to answer for the debt, &c., of another person, &c., \
unless the agreement upon which such action shall be brought,"
&c. In Smith v. Ide, supra,-decided in 1831, with Wain v.
Warlters, and the other English, and- several New York cases to
the same effect, before the court, it was held, i'n
1 a very elaborate
opinion by Judge RoycE, that our statute required that only the
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promise of the party to be charged by it in the suit should be in
writing. Our present statute (Gen. Stat. ch. 24), corresponding
to 29 Car. II., c. 3, s. 4, is as follows: " S. 1. No action at law
or in equity shall be brought in any of the following cases: 1st.
To charge an executor, &c. 2d. To charge any person upon any
special promise to answer for the debt, default, or misdoings of
another. 3d. To charge any person upon any agreement made
upon consideration of marriage. 4th. Upon any contract for the
sale of lands, &6. 5th. Upon any agreement not to be performed
within one year from the making thereof, unless the promise, contract, or agreement upon which such action shall be brought," &c..
In *that last clause the terms promise, contract, or agreement are
used disjunctively and distributively, importing that each is used
by repetition with reference to the same terms respectively in the
five preceding clauses. The closing clause of the English statute
has the term " agreement" only, which, of course, embraces all
the three terms used in the preceding clauses. Now, it is plain
that the term "1agreement" is used in the same sense every time
it is repeated in our original statute of 1822, and that it has no
different meaning when used with. reference to the limitation of
performance within a year, from what it has when used with
reference to actions on agreements or contracts for the debt of
another. In the language of Judge RoycE, in de j- Smith v.
Stanton, 15 Vt; 691, "It is synonymous with special promise or
undertaking." It seems equally plain that the term "agreement" is used in our present statute in precisely the same sense
as in the statute of 1822; and, therefore, the doctrine of the
case of de v. Smith, supra, has direct application and full force.
The idea of the separability of the correlative parts of the contracts embraced in the 1st section of our Statute of Frauds is
recognised and illustrated in Thayer v. Viles et at., 23 Vt. 497;
also in Hodges and Wife v. Green, 28 Id. 358, and in several
other similar cases. The same idea is most'explicitly and fully
presented in the very discriminating and able opinion in -PeirceV.
Estate of -Paine. The plaintiff in that case, in pursuance of the
agreement between himself and Paine, at once made purchase
of the stock; but the transaction could not be consummated till
the lapse of a year, so as to enable it to be determined whether
Paine would be under obligation to pay Peirce anything, depending on the election that Peirce should then make; and, until
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then, Paine was not to, and did not, derive any right or advantage from the transaction. He had received nothing. In no
event was the contract, or his part of the contract, to be performed within a year. It was in view of this fact that the law
was elaborated and applied to the effect that the action could not
be maintained against Paine. But it is prominent for notice that
Chief Justice REDFIELD says,. "t is that portion of the agreement, or contract sued upon, which comes within the statute,
by not being to be performed within the year, and not that portion of the agreement which constitutes the consideration of the
.promise sued upon." This is but treating the doctrine held in the
case of Ide v. Smith, supra, as equally applicable to the 5th clause
of the statute as to the second clause. It may be proper to remark, in passing, that what is thus shown as to the case of Peirce
v. Estate of Paine'shows that the learned annotator, in his note
on Peter v. Compton, on p. 547, 1 Sm. Lead. Cas., ed. of 1866,
was not quite accurate in saying that, in that case, "the question
whether a contract must not be susceptible of performance on
both sides within the year, in order to be valid without writing,
arose in definite form, and was decided in the affirmative."
There are several cases in which it has been held that, when
the contract on the part of either party can be performed within
the year, the statute will not apply, although the other party cannot
perform his part till after the expiration of a year. Under the
decision in .Peircev. Estate of Paine,in connection with what has
been held in other cases in this state, before referred to, we think
that whether the statute applies or not depends on the question
whether the suit is brought against the party that was to perform
his part of the contract within a year. If it is so brought then
the statute would not apply: but if brought against the party
whose agreement was not to be performed within a year, then the
statute would apply. As before intimated, there are cases in
which the fact of performance by the party. who was to perform
within the year has been named and treated as affecting the applicability of the statute; in respect to which I presume to remark
that in the first place, the statute does not in any respect make
the right to maintain an action dependent upon the fact of performance by either party, but upon the intrinsic character of the
contract, as to when, by its terms, the respective executory under-,
takings of the parties may be performed; or, in other words,
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upon the capability of the agreement sued upon to be performed
within a year. In the next place, in none of the cases in which
the actual performance has been named as an element in the right
to maintain the action, was that fact material for that purpose,
so far as the effect of the statute was concerned. That fact would
have been a necessary element in the plaintiff's right of recovery
if there had been no statute. In -Donellanv. _Reed, 3 B. & Adol.
899, of course the plaintiff could not have recovered the stipulated additional rent, if he had failed to make the stipulated improvements. So too in Blanding v. Sargeant, 33 N. H. Rep.
239, the plaintiff could not have recovered if he had failed to do,
on his part that which laid the defendant under obligation to perform his agreement. And the same is true and is well illustrated
by the line of discussion in Holbrook v. Armstrong, 10 Maine Rep.
31. The same is true of every conceivable case of like kind.
In the case before us, as before remarked, the plaintiff had done that
by way of adequate consideration which, independently of the statute, would have rendered the undertaking of the defendant valid
and enforceable against him. Only that which was undertaken by
the defendant was to be done within a year. That undertaking
is here sued upon. His breach of it at once perfected his liability,
and the plaintiff's right of action. Looking to the reason of the
law, under the statute, this case stands for the same consideration
as any case in which the cause of action should arise from the
breach of an agreement that had no relation to the Statute of
Frauds. Upon the occurring of such breach, the right of action
would be perfected; but the party would be at liberty to delay
bringing his suit to the last hour allowed by the Statute of Limitations without affecting the right to maintain the action. The
purpose of the Statute of Frauds is to provide for a class of cases
in which there cannot be an actionable breach within the specified
time. That class embraces only agreements that are not to be
performed within a year. Such agreements as may be wholly
broken within the year, and thereby give a cause of action for
such complete7 breach, do not fall within either'the letter or the
reason of the statute. The present case shows the 'matter in a
strong light. The failure of the defendant to furnish the cow or
the money, as he agreed to do, made an end of the whole arrangement, and left nothing further, either in act or time, to be done
by either party towards the performance of the agreements on
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either side. The plaintiff thereupon ceased to have anything
thereafter to do as matter of obligation to the defendant. The
defendant had nothing to do but to. pay the damage caused by
his breach of agreement; and that breach constituted a perfected
cause and right of action in the plaintiff. This being so, the reason of the law under the statute no more had application and
force than it would have had if the time for the performance of
the agreement on both sides had been limited to a period short of
a year from the making thereof, and the defendant has committed
the same breach that he did in this case.
It is proper further to remark that in all the cases where the
agreement has been held to be within the statute, the action was
for the breach of that side of the contract that was not to be performed within the year: as Boydell v. Drummond, 11 East 142;
Bracegirdlev. Heald, 1 B. & Ald. 727; Peircev. .Estateof Paine,
supra; Broadwell v. Getman, 2 Denio 87. Without pursuing the
subject further, the judgment is affirmed
The foregoing opinion can scarcely.
fail to be of interest to the profession,
being upon the very important point,
how far an action is maintainable upon
one portion of a contract or agreement,
when the other portion of it is confessedly within the Statute of Frauds, and
so not enforceable by action, not being in
writing. In Vermont, as stated in the
opinion, it was decided at an early day
(ide v. Smith, 3 Vt. 290), that undor
that clause in the statute requiring contracts or agreements for the debt of
another to be in writing, it was not re"quisite that the consideration of the contract should. appear in the writing. This
was a departure from the English constraction : Wain v. Warlters, 5 East 10.
But it has been adopted in a considerable number of the states, and, to the extent named, there is, perhaps, no question of the soundness of the decision
upon which the relaxation of the rule in
Wain v. Warlters proceeded. So, too,
where but one side of a contract or
agreement is within the statute, as a
contract for the sale df-land, for a price

agreed to be paid in money, and the portion within the statute has been performed, by conveying the land, there
seems no ground to question the right to
maintain an action for the recovery of
the price stipulated, although we thereby
give effect to one.portion of the contract
not in writing. But if the portion of
the contract falling within the statute
has not been reduced to writing, no
action can be maintained on that portion of it because the other portion has
been performed, as the payment, for instance, of the price of the land, or performance in any other mode: Peircev.
Paine's Estate, 28 Vt. 34, and cases
cited. But it seems to us that there is
no violation of the statute in allowing
an action to be maintained on that portion of the contract, being the entire
stipulation of one party, which is not
within the statute, although the other
portion of the contract could not have
been enforced by action, as in the present case. Such have been the intimations of the English judges in some of
the cases reported. But this must be
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received with some qualification. We
think it is scarcely allowable to hold
that where the portion within the statute
is the sole consideration of that which is
not, and the judgment will impose the
obligation of future performance of that
portion of the contract within the statute, still an action will lie upon that
portion which is not within the statute
so soon as there shall be a breach of the
same. Upon that view, if the price for
the conveyance of land were agreed to
be paid before the time of the conveyance, the party bound to convey, although not by contract in writing, might
sue for the price, and the judgment
would recognise the full validity of the
entire c6ntract, although not in writing.
This seems to us the most obvious disregard both of the letter and spirit of the
entire scope and effect of the statute.
But in a case like the present, where the

defendant elects to disregard that portion
of the contract not within the statute,
by omitting performance of the portion
which shall perfect the obligation of the
other party, which will then be within
the statute, it seems to us he has no
ground of complaint because he is held
responsible on the portion not within the
statute, when he has by his own election
carried it all without the statute, by
electing not to perform on his own part,
and thus releasing the plaintiff from performance of that portion not to be performed within the year. The contract
then stands as if the defendant had stipulated that if he failed to perform on
his own part, according to his stipulation, he *would pay, immediately, and
within one year, all damages, thus by
his own election carrying the whole
contract without the statute.
I. F. R.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.
BILLGERY v. BRANCH & SONS,
All species of contracts or commercial intercourse, whether direct or indirect,
between subjects of Ilifferent powers at war, are invalid.
The late contest between the United States and the Confederate States was a
war.
The government of the Cpnfederate States being a government de facto only,
had jurisdiction and gave national character only to such parts of the territory of
the several states as were under its actual control.
While therefore the city of New Orleans was under the authority of the Confederacy, its citizens were citizens of the Confederacy and enemies of the United
States; but when the city passed into the hands of the Federal forces, it became
again part of the United States, and its citizens became enemies to the Confederate
States.
Where a citizen of Richmond drew a draft upon a citizen of New Orleans-in 1862,
after the capture of the latter city by the United States forces, and the payee, in
February 1863, endorsed the draft to another, a citizen of Vicksburg, within the
Confederate States, who held it until October 1863, and then presented it to
drawee, at New Orleans, who refused payment, and the draft was then protested.
Held, that this was an illegal act, and the holder could not recover.
This is so whether the contract be held void under the general rules of international law or under the Act of Congress of July 13th. 861.
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Intercourse between Vicksburg and New Orleans being unlawful in October
1863, the presentment was not sufficient to justify protest and charging of the
endorsers, even if the contract were originally lawful.
ON the 26th day of August 1862, the Farmers' Bank of Virginia, having its office and transacting business at Richmond, Ya.,
drew three several drafts, each for $2000, and dated Richmond,
payable to John Enders, or order, on the New Orleans Canal and
Banking Company, a corporation having its principal office and
transacting its business in New Orleans.
New Orleans passed under the permanent control of the Federal
authority early in May 1862. Richmond remained under the
control of the Confederates until April 1865. On the day of
the drawing of these checks the Farmers' Bank had a credit
of $13,000 in the Canal Bank, created while both were within
the Confederate lines; but this sum had been sequestrated by
an order of General Butler, of June 23d 1862, and was paid
over to a Federal quartermaster, by order of General Banks, on
the 26th of August 1863. These checks were endorsed by Enders
to defendants, at what time did not appear, and in February 1863
they were endorsed by defendants and sold to plaintiff, who resided
in Vicksburg, Miss. Directly after the purchase of them, Billgery returned to Vicksburg, where he remained until the capture
of that place by the Federal forces, on the 4th of July 1863. In
October 1863 he went to New Orleans, presentsd the checks to
tlie Canal Bank, and, on its refusal to pay them, protested them,
and notice of protest was duly deposited in the post-office in New
Orleans, directed to defendants,-Petersburg, Va. Early in 1865,
some two weeks after Lee's surrender, Billgery wrote by mail to
them also, at Petersburg, informing them of the non-payment of
these checks, endorsed by them. The mails were then opened
between Richmond and New Orleans, but defendants never received the letter.
Billgery brought his action on the case'in the Circuit Court
for the city of Richmond, declaring gpecially on the above state
of facts, to which the defendants demurred and pleaded the
general issue, and the case, by agreement, being heard before the
court on the law and the facts, judgment was for defendants.

Henry A. Wise, for plaintiff in error.
James Alfred Jones and W. 'f. Crump, for defendants.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
JOYNFS, J.-The counsel for the defendants have contended in
the argument, 1. That the contracts arising out of the endorsement and delivery of the checks by the defendants to the plaintiff,
were illegal and void, so that no action could be founded upon
them, 2. That if these contracts were legal and valid, there has
been no sufficient presentment and demand of payment of the
checks, and, 8. That if the presentment and demand were sufficient, there has been no sufficient notice of dishonor.
Premising that a check is a bill of exchange, though subject to
some peculiar rules, which need. not now be adverted to, and that
eVery endorsement of a bill is equivalent to the drawing of a new
bill, I proceed to consider the first and principal question.
It is a general principle of law, that war operates as an interdiction of all commercial and other pacific intercourse and communication with the public enemy, and it follows as a corollary from
this principle, that every species of private contract made with
subjects of the enemy, during war, is unlawful. "The rule thus
deduced," says Wheaton, "is applicable to insurance on enemy's
property and trade, to the drawing and negotiating of bills of
exchange between subjects of the powers at war, to the remission
of funds, in money or bills, to the enemy's country, to commercial
partnerships entered into between the subjects of the two countries, after the declaration of war, or existing previous to the
declaration, which last are dissolved by the mere *forceand act -of
the war itself, although as to other contracts [existing before the
war], it only suspends the remedy :". Wheaton Elements by Lawrence 556. So 1 Kent 67-8. The same great jurist uses this
language in Griswolt v. JFaddington,16 John. R. 48a. "There
is no authority in law, whether that law be national, maritime, or
municipal, for any kind of private, voluntary, unlicensed business,
communication, or intercourse with an enemy. It is all noxious,
and, in a greater or less degree, is all criminal. Every attempt at
drawing distinctions has failed; all kind of intercourse except
that which is hostile, or created by the mere exigency of the war
and necessity of the case, is illegal. The law has put the sting of
disability into every kind of voluntary communication and contract
with an enemy, which is made without the special permission of
the government. There is wisdom and policy, patriotism and
safety, in this principle, and every relaxation of it tends to
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corrupt the allegiance of the subjeet and prolong the calamities
of war.
The idea that any remission of money may be lawfully made to
an enemy, is repugnant to the very rights of war, which require
the subjects of one country to seize the effects of the subjects of
the other. The property so remitted, if in cash or any tangible
subject, would become a just cause of seizure while on its passage.
An alien enemy has no right of action during war, and he cannot
sue, because it would be drawing resources out of the country;
how then can it be lawful to make remittances to him? The law
that forbids intercourse and trade, must equally forbid remittances
and payment." See Halleck Int. Law, 356 et seg.; Note to
(lementson v. Blesszg et al., 11 Exch. R. 135, s. c. 32 Eng. L. &
Eq. 544.
In TWillison v. .Pattesonet al., 7 Taunt. 439 (2 Eng. C. L. R.
169), s. c. 1 J. B. Moore 133 (which latter report of it I will cite,
as it is much fuller and better in every way than the other), was an
action of assumpsit on three bills of exchange accepted by the
defendants, and endorsed to the plaintiff. Thie bills were drawn
at:Dunkirk in France by Michelon, a subject of France resident
there, payable to his own order, three months after date, upon.
the defendants, British subjects resident in London, who were the:
holders of certain cambrics shipped to them, by Yarlet of Dunkirk,
and by him assigned to Michelon. The bills were'accepted, paya-:
ble when the cambrics should be sold, which was subsequently
done. The bills were endorsed by Michelon, the drawer, to the.
plaintiff, an English born subject, then and still a resident of
Dunkirk. At the time these bills were diawn, endorsed, and
accepted, France and England were at open war with each other..
The action was brought after the return of peace, and the court
held.that it could not be maintained.

GIBBS, C. J., in giving the.

reasons of his judgment, said: "It is illegal for an alien, -in an
enemy's country, during war, to draw a bill on.a subject resident
in this, and then sue him here for the amount of such bill, on the
restoration of peace. It gives rise to a communication between
subjects of both countries which ought to be avoided.. The
drawing and accepting of these bills are in themselves illegal."
PAxir, J., after quoting the rule ex natura belli commeruia inter
hostes ceesare non est dubitandum, adds: "Although. the evidence of trading is not conclusive, it is still a trading." * *
VOL. XV[I.-22
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"Though the plaintiff might be in ignorance of the circumstances
attending these bills, still he receives them from the drawer,
and must, therefore, be fully aware that they were a species
of contract, originating with an alien enemy." BURROTJGH, J.,
said: "1It was the object of the drawer in the present case,
who was an alien, to obtain money from the acceptors, who were
resident in this country; the drawer having assigned [consigned?]
the cambrics to the acceptor for sale, is entitled to the money
arising on the' bills. Can it be contended, that if the cambrics
had been sold, Michelon could have maintained an action for
money had and received? If not, he could, by no device,
olitain it from this country. If, therefore, the action for money
had and received could not be maintained by Michelon, being an
alien enemy, can he possibly transfer his interest to another,
which interest will ultimately revert to his benefit?" In Williion
v. Pattesonthere was an actual communication had, and a contract
directly made, between subjects of the hostile powers, inasmuch
as the bill was sent over from France to England for acceptance,
and was accepted. But it is not necessary that any such actual
communication should take place. in order to vitiate the contract
of the drawer or endorser of a bill. When a man draws a bill
upon another, and negotiates it, he in substance and fact despatches
a communication to him, directing him to pay the money to the
owner of the bill. The drawing and negotiation of the bill have
a direct tendency to bring about actual intercourse and communication, because the bill cannot otherwise perform its office. 'And
upon general principles, any contract is unlawful which has a tendency to promote and encourage the doing of an act which the
law condemns and forbids, whether, in any particular case, the
act be really done or not. Upon this ground, the vice attaches
to the drawing and negotiation of the bill. The other ground of
decision stated by BURROUGH, J., namely, that the bill is an
attempt by the drawer to transfer to another a right to demand
and receive money which he could not lawfully demand himself,
leads to the-same result. Obviously, if the drawer may lawfully
draw for his funds in the hands of the drawee, the drawee may
lawfully pay the drafts, or remit the funds. But, as we have
seen, the payment or remittance of money by a subject or citizen
of one belligerent to a subject or citizen of the other, during war,
is unlawful: Griswold v. Waddington, supra.
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But it was contended, with great earnestness and ability, by the
counsel for the plaintiff, that the rights of the parties in this case
must be determined with referenc'e to the municipal law alone;
that the late conflict between the United States and the Confederate States was not a war, in the legal sense, and did not produce the effects of a war upon the rights and relations of citizens;
that on the part of the Confederate States, it was nothing more
than an insurrection or rebellion against the lawful authority of
the United States, and on the part of the United States was only
an exertion of force to suppress the insurrection; and that the
principles of international law, applicable to a state of war inter
gentes, cannot properly be resorted to for the determination of any
question between citizens arising out of that conflict, or affected
by it. It was further argued, that the only restriction upon intercourse during the war was that imposed by the Act of Congress
of July 13th 1861, and the proclamation of August 16th 1861,
which was merely a suspension, for a time, of the right of free
intercourse guaranteed by the Constitution, and that the existence
of the conflict between the government and the insurgents, and
the suspension of intercourse during its existence, did not deprive
any citizen of the right to draw a bill of exchange upon another
citizen, or any other citizen of the right to purchase such a bill,
even though the drawer and drawee were on opposite sides of the
conflict, such acts not involving any actual locomotive intercourse,
which would alone violate the prohibition against intercourse; and
that in order to defeat a recovery in this case, it was incumbent on
the defendants to establish that there has been a violation of that
prohibition.
I shall not enter upon a discussion of the theory and principles
of the Constitution of the United States, or of the respective rights
and powers of the Federal and State governments, for the purpose
of determining the political and constitutional character and consequences of the late unhappy conflict. Fortfanately, such a discussion is not necessary. The principles of law which are to be
applied to the solution of the question now before us seem to me
to have been fully settled by the Supreme Court of the United
States. I do not think it necessary to cite the decisions of any
inferior tribunal, and shall cite only a few cases in the Supreme
Court.
The subject of the late war first came before the Supreme Court
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in The Prize Case8, 2 Black R. 6.35, decided at December Term
1862. These cases involved the validity of certain captures for
breach of the blockade established by President Lincoln in April
1861, at a time when no legislation had been had by Congress in
reference to the war. Four vessels were involved, two of which
belonged to neutrals, and two to citizens of Richmond, Va. Two
questions were discussed and decided by the court: 1. Had the
President a right to institute a blockade of ports in the possession
of persons in armed rebellion against the government, on the principles of international law ? 2. Was the property of persons
domiciled or residing within the states in rebellion a proper subject of capture on the sea as "enemies' property ?"
The court, after observing that the right of prize and cpture
depended on the Yu belli, proceeded to inquire whether, at the
time of the blockade, a state of war existed between the United
States and the insurgents. If the relations existing under the
Constitution between the government and the insurgents had the
effect of rendering it impossible that a conflict between them could
be a war, in the legal sense, and of restricting the government to
the use of means provided by the municipal law for the suppression of 'an insurrection, then the blockade was not lawfully instituted. In order, therefore, to determine the validity of a blockade it was necessary to determine what was the legal character of
the relations existing between the parties to the conflict. The
following extracts from the opinion exhibit the views of the court.
"A civil war breaks the bonds of society and government, or at
least ouspends their force and effect; It produces in the nation two
independent parties, who consider each other as enemies, and acknowledge no common judge. These two parties, therefore, must
necessarily be considered as constituting, at least for a time, two
separate bodies, two distinct societies. Having no common superior to judge between them, they stand in precisely the same
predicament as two nations who engage in a contest, and have
recourse to.arms." "1The true test of the existence of civil 'war,
as found in the writings of the sages of the common law, may
be thus summarily stated: When the regular course of justice is
interrupted by revolti rebellion, or insurrection, so that the courts
of justice cannot be kept open, civil war exists, and hostilities
may be prosecuted on the same footing as if those opposing the
government were foreign enemies invading the ]and." " It is
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not the less a civil war with belligerent parties in hostile- array,
because it may be called an insurrection by one side, and the
insurgents be considered as rebels or traitors."
Pursuing these views, and others which need not be adverted
to, the court held that there existed between the government of
the United States and the insurgents a state of civil war in the
sense of international law, which brought with it the common
incidents of war, and among them the right to institute a blockade. The views of the court upon the second question will appear from the following extracts: "The appellants contend that
the term 'enemy' is properly applicable to those only who are
subjects or citizens of a foreign state at war with our own." * * *
"1They contend also that insurrection is the act of individuals,
and not of a government or sovereignty; that the individuals
engaged are subjects of law; that confiscation of their property
can be effected only under a municipal law; that by the law of
the land such confiscation cannot take place without the conviction of the owner of some offence; and finally, that the secession
ordinances are nullities, and ineffectual to release any citizen from
his allegiance to the national government, and consequently that
the constitution and laws of the United States are still operative
over persons in all the states for punishment as well as proteotion." The court proceeded to show that the claim of sovereignty
on the part of the United States did not prevent -the exercise of
belligerent rights or the existence of belligerent relations, and
added, "All persons who reside within the [insurgent] territory
whose property may be used to increase the revenues of the hostile power, are, in this contest, liable to be treated as enemies,
though not foreigners. They have cast off their allegiance and
made war on their government, and are none the less enemies because they are traitors."
The four dissenting judges held that war, in the legal sense,
did not exist at the time the blockade was instituted, because it
had not been declared by Congress. They held that prior to the
Act of Congress of July 13th 1861, the President could only
exercise the power given to him by the municipal laws, his operations being limited to the suppression of an insurrection, but that
Congress could bring into operation the war power, and thus
change the nature and character of the contest, and that after
such action by Congress, instead of being carried on under the
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municipal law, it would be carried on under the law of nations,
and the Acts of Congress as war measures, with all the rights of
war: p. 692. They not only held that such a contest, after the
action of Congress, would give to the *government the rights of
war under the international law, but that it would likewise be
attended with the consequences of war in respect to the rights
and relations of citizens: pp. 688, 693. On p. 687 the consequences of a state of war, according to international law, are stated.
They are referred to as consequences which must result from regarding the pending conflict as a civil war. The judge says: "The people of the two countries become immediately the enemies of each
other-all intercourse, commercial or otherwise, unlawful-all
contracts existing at the commencement of the war suspended,
and all made during its existence utterly void. The insurance of
enemy's property-the drawing of bills of exchange, or the purchase [of bills] on the enemy's country-the remission of bills or
money to ft, are illegal and void. Existing partnerships between
citizens or subjects of the two countries are dissolved, and in fine,
interdiction of trade and intercourse, direct or indirect, is absolute' and complete, by the mere force and effect of war itself."
The only point upon which the minority differed from the majority was, in respect to the time. at which the conflict assumed the
character of a war, in the legal sense. The majority held that
the conflict had become a war by the mere course of events, and
without any action by Congress, while the minority held that the
action of Congress was indispensable to give it that character.
But there was no difference of opinion in respect to the legal consequences resulting from the state 'of war, whenever the conflict
assumed that character.
In The VZenice, 2 Wall. R. 258, the court say: "While these
transactions were in progress the war was flagrant; the states of
Louisiana and Mississippi were wholly under rebel dominion, and
all the people of each state were enemies of the United States.
The rule which declares that war makes all ihe citizens or subjects
of one belligerent enemies of the government and of all the citizens
or subjects of the other, applies equally to civil and international
wars." This relation of mutual enmity is one of the fundamental
conditions of a stat& of war. It is part of a system of rules for
the government of men in a state of war, which is founded in
necessity, and which has been established by common consent
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throughout the world. That system, as we have seen, subjects
individuals to restraints and disabilities in respect to their acts
and contracts, which are unknown in time of peace. The relation of the citizens of the several states, under the Constitution,
is that of friends--the relation between citizens on opposite sides
in the late war, was that of enemies. The relations under the
Constitution were suspended and superseded for the time, by new
relations under the laws of war. And so the rights and 'privileges
existing under the Constitution, in respect to intercourse and contracts, were, of necessity, displaced and superseded, for the time,
by the restraints and disabilities which resulted from the state of
war.
In The Hampton, 5 Wallace R. 372, the vessel was captured
in a creek in the state of Virginia, and was libelled and condemned
as prize of war, upon the principles of international law. Brinkley, a loyal citizen, appeared and claimed the vessel as mortgagee.
The bona fides of the mortgage was not disputed, nor was it disputed that he was a loyal citizen. The precise offence for which
the vessel was libelled is not stated in the report, but it was conceded that the vessel might have been condemned under the Act
of July 18th 1861. The offence, therefore, was one embraced by
that act, which provides that goods, &c., coming from or going to
a state in insurrection, by land or water, along with the vessel,
&c., in which they are, shall be forfeited.
It was held that the vessel was properly condemned under
the international law, which was not suspended by the Act of
Congress; and that notwithstanding the loyalty of the mortgagee,
and the fairness of his debt, his right was forfeited upon the
principles of international law, though it would have been saved
if the condemnation had taken place under the Act of Congress.
The court therefore decided-1. That intercourse during the
late war was unlawful upon the principles of international law,
and independently of the Act of Congress.. And 2. That the
effect of the international law was to override and extinguish the
claim of a loyal citizen under a bondfide mortgage.
In The William Bagaly, 5 Wallace R. 877, Brogden, who
claimed a share of the vessel and cargo, was a loyal citizen, resident in Indiana. At the breaking out of the war he was a member of a mercantile partnership in Mobile, which owned the vessel.
and cargo. He never aided the rebellion-never, after the
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rebellion began, exercised any control or ownership over the
vessel or cargo, and had no connection with or knowledge of the
unlawful voyage which occasioned the capture. In consequence
of his loyalty to the United States, his interest in the partnership
effects had been confiscated by the Confederate government. His
claim was rejected. The court held, among other things, that the
effect of the war was to dissolve the partnership existing between
the claimant and the parties in Mobile, and that it was his duty
promptly to didpose of and withdraw his interest, and that by his
failure to do so, his interest became liable to be treated as enemy's
property. These propositions were based exclusively on the
principles applicable to international wars. The court further
recognised the principle applicable to war inter gentes, that an
executory contract with a citizen or subject of the enemy, if it
cannot be performed except in the way of commercial intercourse
with the enemy, is ipso facto dissolved, as equally applicable to
the late war. ,
In Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wallace R. 532, the principles of law
applicable to a state of war inter gentes, were applied to the
late civil war, to determine whether the Statute of Limitations of
Arkansas ran during the war against a cause of action held at the
commencement of the war by citizens of New Hampshire against
a citizen of Arkansas.
In the opinion of the court, the ordinary consequences of a
war inter gentes-the prohibition of intercourse-the dissolution
of partnerships-the prohibition of contracts made during the
war, and the suspension or dissolution of contracts made beforthe war-the right to confiscate debts due to citizens or subjects
of the enemy-the suspension of the remedy for the recovery of
debts, and the restoration of the remedy upon the return of peacewere fully stated, and were recognised as equally applicable to the
late civil war.
It was accordingly held that the Act of Limitations did not run
during the war. And this decision was placed exclusively upon
the principles of international law, applicable to a state of war
inter gentes.
These decisions of -the Supreme Court settle beyond question,
that the late conflict between the United States and the Confederate States was a war, in the legal sense, with all the incidents
and consequences of a war, as they are known to the international

BILLGERY v. BRANCH.

law; that accordingly all the citizens on one side were enemies of
all the citizens on the other, and that all commercial or other
pacific intercourse or communication between them, unless specially
authorized, was unlawful to the same extent and for the same
reasons as in a war inter gentes; and that in order to determine
how the contracts of individual citizens were affected by the late
war, recourse must be had to the general.principles applicable to
a state of war, as they are found in the international code.
This doctrine by no means involves a recognition of the Confederate States as a political sovereignty. The concession by the
government of belligerent rights to the Confederate States, and
the application by the courts of the general laws of war to the
determination of questions arising out of the late conflict, only
recognise the existence of a conflict of such magnitude, and with
such an array of strength, that it could not be dealt with otherwise
than as a war; they involve no concession of political rights to
the association of states which carried on the conflict.
Nor does the fact that Louisiana was one of the Confederate
States, and that the city of New Orleans was to the last claimed
by the Confederate States as belonging to them, afford any groundfor refusing to apply the law of war to their case. The checks
were drawn and endorsed after the city of New Orleans had passed
*under the permanent dominion and control of the United States.
Its relations to the Confederate States, which were only a government de facto, and whose authority was therefore dependent upon
the exercise of power, and not upon tho existence of right, was
then broken up and destroyed. From that time we must regard New
Orleans as belonging to the Federal side of the conflict, and its
citizens as enemies of the citizens of the other belligerent: 6
Wallace 521 and cases cited. Nor does it make any difference
that the plaintiff and defendant were, all of them, citizens of the
Confederate States, if, as claimed by the defendants, the contract
between them was in violation of the common .law of the civilized
world.
I do not think it necessary to consider whether, as contended
by the counsel for the plaintiff, the Act of Congress of July 18th
1861, and the proclamations of the President in pursuance of it,
prohibiting commercial intercourse, were a law to the parties to
this suit, at the date of their contract, all of whom were then
citizens and residents of the Confederate States. If they were,
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it would not follow, as contended by the counsel, that actual locomotive intercourse was necessary in'order to affect the contract
between these parties. Such actual locomotive intercourse accomplished or attempted, would doubtless be necessary, as under the
general law of war, to subject property to forfeiture. But the
prohibition of intercourse thus made by Congress, must be construed with reference to the object it was designed to effect, and
so enforced as to accomplish the policy on which it was founded.
It was obviously dictated by the same policy and designed to effect
the same ends as the like prohibition in the international law, and
any contract which would be regarded as a violation of the one,
ought to be regarded as a violation of the other. But even if this
Act of Congress did not operate as a law to the parties to this
suit, at the date of their contract, I apprehend that no court of
the United States or of a state should lend its aid for the enforce-.
ment of a contract, made in violation of the policy of that act.
This court must deal with this case.just as a court of the United
States would deal with it.'
The argument that Billgery had a right, which was guaranteed
-to him by the Constitution, to go to New Orleans at his pleasure,
which was only suspended by the war, seems to me to have no
force. The suspension was accompanied by an absolute interdict
of all commercial intercourse in the mean time, and a consequent
disability to enforce any contract made during the war, which
INote by Judge Joynes.-Substantially the same question involved in this case
was decided by Chief Justice CHASE, in the,Circuit Court, at Richmond, June
1868, in the case of foore 4- Bro. v. Foster 4- Moore, of which I have obtained an
authentic account since this opinion was delivered.
The action was brought to recover the amount of certain negotiable notes. The
defendants pleaded payment and accord and satisfaction, and to sustain their
defence gave in evidence a draft drawn by the Bank of North Carolina, at its
branch in Winslow, in that state, on the branch of the Bank of Virginia at Portsmouth, bearing date the 10th day of December 1862, which draft, it was contended, was delivered by the defendants to the plaintiffs, and accepted by them in
payment of the debt. At the date of the draft, Portsmouth was in the permanent
occupation and control of the forces of the United States, but the condition of
Winslow in that respect was a subject of dispute. The Chief Justice instructed the
jury, IIthat if they should find that Winslow was not, at the time of the making
and issuing of the draft, in the occupation or control of the national forces, then
the draft in controversy, being an act of prohibited commercial intercourse, was
not valid negotiable paper." Whether Winslow was so occuiied or controlled,
be left to the jury.
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tended to produce a violation of that interdict. The interdict
was as absolute, while it lasted, and as fatal to all contracts in
violation of its policy, as if it had been perpetual, or as if there
had been no such general -right of intercourse under the Constitution.
It was argued, too, that Billgery might have intended to keep
these checks until it should become lawful to present them for
payment, and that the court ought rather to presume a lawful
than an unlawful intent. I doubt whether a party who makes a
contract during war, which, upon its face, and according to the
usual intent and import of such contracts, is a violation of the
policy of non-intercourse, ought to be allowed to say that he did
not design any such violation. It would be difficult to determine
whether such an averment was founded in truth, and to permit
such defences to be alleged, would cripple the efficiency of the
rule, which, we are told, admits no exception (6 Wallace R. 535),
and which declares "1a strict and rigorous" policy, which no artifice is permitted to evade.
But what are the facts ? Billgery parted with his money to
Branch & Sons, in February 1863. He would necessarily lose
interest until he could collect the money on the checks. He has
been examined as a witness, as have also the only two of the defendants who were cognisant of the transaction. Neither of them
testifies that there was any understanding or expectation that the
presentment of the checks would be withheld, much less any contract that they should be withheld until it should be lawful to present them. On the contrary, John P. Branch, who conducted the
transaction with Billgery, shows his understanding and expectation,. when he says that he "judged Billgery to be a blockaderunner." And not only does Billgery nowhere say that there was
any understanding with Branch, or any intention on his own part,
that presentment would' be delayed, but he admits that after he
bought the checks, he tried to find somebody by whom he could
send them to New Orleans for collection, but could not. The
checks indeed seem to have remained in Virginia from August
1862, when they were drawn, to February 1863, when they were
sold to Billgery. But that fact throws no light on the contract
between Billgery and Branch & Sons. It may be accounted for
by supposing that nobody had been found, in that interval, who
wanted funds in New Orleans, or who would pay enough for them.
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When we remember how much activity and enterprise were displayed during the war in "running the blockade," and the large
profits that were made by it, we should require pretty strong proof
to convince us that a partly who drew a sight draft on a point
where Federal money was to be had, contemplated that it would
be withheld from presentment for the indefinite period of the war,
or that a party who laid out a large sum in the purchase of such a
draft, intended so to withhold it.
It follows from these views that, upon the evidence, judgment
was properly rendered for the defendants. They also show that
the demurrers to the special counts were properly sustained. Each
of these counts sets out the drawing of a check by a bank in
Richmond upon a bank in New Orleans, and the endorsement of
the check by the defendants to the plaintiff, at periods when we
know that the war was flagrant, and all commercial and other
intercourse between Richmond and New Orleans 'were unlawful.
But even if the contract could be held valid, there is another
ground which is fatal to the case of the plaintiff, both upon the
pleadings and the evidence. In order to charge the defendants
as endorsers, it was necessary thatthe checks should be presentea
to the.0anal Bank, and payment thereof demanded, and, in case
of dishonor, that due notice thereof should be given to the defendants.. The only presentment and demand set out in the pleadings,
or proved by the evidence, were made on the 27th day of October
1863, when all commercial intercourse between Vicksburg, where
the plaintiff resided, and New Orleans, where the checks were
payable, was unlawful. By the proclamation of the President
dated August 16th 1861, prohibiting intercourse with the. states
in rebellion, an exception was made of "such parts of states as
may be from time to time occupied and controlled by forces of the
United States engaged in the dispersion of the insurgents." This
exception is set out in the amended declaration and was relied on in
the argument, as authorizing Billgery to go to New Orleans after
the fall of 'icksburg.
But this exception was repealed by the
proclamation of April 2d 1863. That proclamation declared the
same states to be in insurrection, and revoked all the exceptions
made in the former proclamation, but again made certain local
exceptions, of which "the port of New Orleans" was one. This
proclamation declares " that all commercial intercourse not licensed
and conducted as is provided in said act, between the said states
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and the inhabitants thereof, with the exceptions aforesaid, is unlawful, and will remain unlawful until such insurrection shall cease
or has been suppressed, and notice thereof has been given by proclamation." Vicksburg was not excepted from the operation of
this proclamation, so that commercial intercourse, except with the
license of the President, between Vicksburg and New Orleans was
unlawful at the time at which presentment of these checks was
made. The license given to Billgery by the military authorities
was a nullity: Ouachita Cotton, 6 Wall. R. 521. The demand
of payment, therefore, which was made, was one which the plaintiff could not lawfully make, and which the Canal Bank could not
lawfully comply with. A demand to charge the endorsers should
have been one which the Bank might lawfully have complied with.
In respect to the question of notice of dishonor, very little need
be said. To give any effect to the notice deposited in th6 postoffice in New Orleans in October 1863, it should at least have
been shown that the law, or a general usage, required that the
letter containing the notice should be preserved by the postmaster
until the restoration of intercourse, and then forward it to its
destination. In the absence of such proof, the deposit of a notice
in the post-office at New Orleans, addressed to Petersburg, in the
midst of the war, was of no avail. It is not necessary to express
an opinion as to whether the evidence is sufficient to prove that
due notice was given to the defendants after the close of the war.
Upon the whole, I am of opinion that the judgment ought to be
affirmed.
MONCURE, P., concurred.
Rrms, J., dissented.

Supreme Court of Wiconsin.
EMMA SCHNEIDER v. THE PROVIDENT LIFE INSURANCE CO.
An "accident" within the meaning of a policy of insurance means an event
which happens from some external violence or vismajor, and which is unexpected,
because it is from an unknown cause, or is an unusual result of a known cause.
Negligence of the person injured does not prevent it from being an accident.
Therefore in an action on a policy of insurance against accident, the negligence
of the insured is no defence.
A policy of insurance against accident contained a clause against liability for
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injury resulting from the assured "wilfully and wantonly exposing himself to any
unnecessary danger." The assured attempted to get on a train of cars while in
slow motion, and fell and was killed. Held, that the negligence was not wilful
or wanton, and the company were liable.

THIS was an action on a policy, by which Bruno Schneider was
insured against injury or death by accident. The policy contained
a clause that the company should not be liable for any injury
happening to the assured by reason of his "wilfully and wantonly exposing himself to any unnecessary danger or peril."
The assured attempted to get on a train of cars after it had
started, but was moving slowly, but fell and was killed. On the
trial the plaintiff was nonsuited, on the ground that the evidence
showed the case to be within the exception as to wilful exposure
to danger.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
PAINE, J.-The position most strongly urged by the respondent's counsel in this court, was that inasmuch as the negligence of
the deceased contributed to produce the injury, therefore the death
was not occasioned by an accident at all, vithin the meaning of the
policy. I cannot assent to this proposition. It would establish a
limitation to the meaning of the word "accident" which has never
been established either in law or in common understanding. A
very large proportion of those events which are universally called
accidents happen through some carelessness of the party injured,
which contributes to produce them. Thus men are injured by the
careless use of firearms; of explosive substances, of m.chinery, the
careless management of horses, and in a thousand ways, when it
cQn readily be seen afterwards that a little greater care on their
part would have prevented it. Yet such injuries having been
unexpected and not caused intentionally or by design, are always
called accidents, and properly so. Nothing is more common than
items in the newspapers under the heading, "IAccidents through
carelessness."
There is nothing in the definition of the word that excludes the
negligence of the assured party as one of the elements contribut-"
ing to produce the result. An accident is defined as "an event that
takes place without one's foresight or expectation; an event which
proceeds from an unknown cause; or is an unusual effect of a
known cause, and therefore not expected."

SCHNEIDER v. LIFE INSURANCE CO.

An accident may happen from an unknown cause. But it is
not essential that the cause should be unknown. It may be an
unusual result of a known cause, and therefore unexpected to the
party. And such was the case here, conceding that the negligence
of the deceased was the cause of the accident.
It is true that accidents often happen from such kinds of negligence. But still it is equally true that they are not the usual
result. If they were, people would cease to be guilty of such
negligence. But cases in which accidents occur are very rare in
comparison with the number in which there is the same negligence
without any accident. A man draws his loaded gun toward him
by the muzzle-the servant fills the lighted lamp with kerosene,
a hundred times without injury. The next time the gun is discharged, or the lamp explodes. The result was unusual, and
therefore unexpected. So there are undoubtedly thousands of
persons who get on and off from cars in motion without accident,
wfiere one is injured. And therefore when an injury occurs it is
an unusual result, and unexpected, and strictly an accident.
There are not many authorities on the point. The respondent's
counsel cites Theohald v. The Bailway Passengers' Assurance
Co., 26 E. Law & Eq. 482, not as a direct authority, but as containing an implication that the negligence of the injured party
would prevent a recovery. I do not think it can be construed as
conveying any such intimation. The insurance tlere was against
a particular kind of accident; that was a railway accident, and
the only question was, whether the injury was occasioned by an
accident of that kind. The court held that it was, and although
it mentions the fact that there was no negligence on the part of
the assured, that cannot be considered as any intimation what
would have been the effect of negligence if it had existed.
The general question as to what constituted an accident was
considered in two subsequent cases in England. The first was
Rinelairv. The..faritime Passengers'Assurance Co., 3 El. & El.
478 (E. C. L. R. vol. 107), in which the question was, whether a
sunstroke was an accident within the meaning of the policy. The
court held that it was not, but was rather to be classed among
diseases occasioned by natural causes, like exposure to malaria,
&c., and while admitting the difficulty of giving a definition to the
term accident which would be of universal application, they say
they may safely assume "that some violence, casualty, or vi&major
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is necessarily involved." There could be no question in this case
that all these were involved.
In the subsequent case of Trew v. Bailway Passengers' Assurance Co., 6 Hurl. & Nor. 839, the question was, whether a death
by drowning was accidental. The counsel relied on the language
of the former case, afid urged that there was no external force or
violence. But the court held that if the death was occasioned by
drowning, it was accidental within the meaning of the policy. And
in answer to the argument of counsel they said: "If a man fell
from a housetop, or overboard from a ship, and was killed; or if
a man was suffocated by the smoke of a house on fire, such cases
would be excluded from the policy, and the effect would be, that
policies of this kind, in many cases where death resulted from
accident, would afford no protection whatever to the assured. We
ought hot to give to these policies a construction which will defeat
the protection of the assured in a large class of cases."
There was no suggestion that there was any question to be made
as to the negligence of the deceased, and yet the court said: "We
think it ought to be submitted to the jury to say whether the
deceased died from the action of the water, or natural causes. If
they are of the opinion that he died from the action of the water,
causing asphyxia, that is a death from external violence within
the meaning of the policy, whether he swam to a distance and had
not strength enough to regain the shore, or on going into the
water got out of his depth."'
Now either of-these facts would seem to raise as strong an infer ence of negligence as an attempt to get upon cars in slow motion.
Yet the court said that although the drowning was occasioned by
either one of them, it would have been a death within the meaning
of the policy, and the plaintiffs entitled to recover. I cannot conceive that it would have made such a remark except upon the
assumption that the question, whether the injured party was guilty
of negligence contributing to the accident, does not arise at all in
this class of cases. I think that is the true conclusion, both upon
principle and authority, so far as there is any upon the subject;
and the only questions are, first, whether the death or injury was
occasioned by an accident within the general meaning of the
policy, and if so, whether it was within any of the exceptions.
This conclusion is also very strongly supported by that provision of the policy under which the plaintiff was nonsuited. That
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necessarily implies that any degree of negligence falling short of
"wilful and wanton exposure to unnecessary danger" would not
prevent a recovery. Such a provision would be entirely superfluous and unmeaiiing in such a contract, if the observance of due
care and skill- on the part of the assured constituted an element to
his right of action, as it does in actions for injuries occasioned by
the negligence of the defendant.
The question therefore remains whether the attempt of the
deceased to get upon the train was within this provision, and constituted a "wilful and wanton exposure of himself to unnecessary
danger ?" I cannot think so. The evidence showed that the
train having once been to the platform, had backed so that the
cars stood at some little distance from it; while it was waiting there
the deceased was walking back and forth on the platform (of the
depot). It is very ?robable that he expected the train to stop
there again before finally leaving. But it did not. It came along,
and while moving at a slow rate, or as fast as a man could walk,
he attempted to get on and by some means fell either under or by
the side of the cars and was crushed to death. The act may have
been imprudent. It may have been such negligence as would
have prevented a recovery in an action based upon the negligence
of the company f there had been any. But it does not seem to
have 'contained those elements which could be justly characterized.
as wilful or wanton. The deceased was in the regular prosecution:
of his. business. He desired and expected to leave on that train.
Finding that he would be left unless he got on while it was in
motion, it was natural enough for him to make the attempt. Thestrong disinclination which people have to being left, would impel.
him to do so. The railroad employees were getting'on at aboutthe, same time. Imnrudent though it is, it is a common practice.
for others to get on and off in the same manner. He had undoubtedly seen it done, if he had not done it himself, many times with
out injury. I cannot regard it, therefore, as a wilful and wanton
exposure of himself to unnecessary danger within the meaning of'
the policy.
The judgment is reversed, and a venire de novo awarded..
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WARD v. SMITH.

S'upreme Court of the United States.
WILLIAM WARD ET AL. V. FRANCIS L. SMITH.

The fact that an instrument is made payable ata bank does not make the bank
actually deposits the instrument
an agent of payee to receive payment, unless nie
there, or in some express manner authorizes the bank to act for him.
When an instrument is lodged with a bank for collection, the bank becomes the
agent of the payee or obligee to receive payment. The agency extends no further,
and without special authority an agent can only receive payment of the debt due his
principal in the legal currency of the country, or in bills which pass as money at
their par value by the common consent of the community.
.The'doctrine that bank bills are a good tender unless objected to at the time, only
applies to current bills which are redeemed at the counter of the bank, and pass at
par value in business transactions in the place where offered.
Payment of a check in the bills of a suspended bank, not known to the parties to
be suspdnded, is not a satisfaction.
Where the debtor and the creditor's known agent to receive the money, reside
in the same jurisdiction, the fact that the creditor is a citizen of a power at war with
the debtor's government, and resident in the hostile state, does not absolve the debtor
from his obligation to pay, and if he does not, he is liable for interest.

Lz error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maryland.
In August 1860, the plaintiff in error, William Ward, purchased
of Smith certain property in Virginia, and gave him for the-consideration-money the three joint and several bonds of himself and
co-defendant, upon which the present action was brought. These
bonds, each for.a sum exceeding four thousand dollars, bear date
of the 22d of that month, payable, with interest, in six, twelve, and
eighteen months after'date, "at the office of discount and deposit
of the Farmers' Bank of Virginia, at Alexandria."
In February 1861 the first bond was deposited at the bank
designated for collection. At the time there was endorsed upon
it a credit of over five hundred dollars; and it was admitted that
subsequently the further sum of twenty-five hundred, dollars was
received by Smith, and that the amount ok certain taxes on the
estate purchased, paid by Ward, was to be deducted.
In May 1861, Smith left Alexandria, and remained within the
Confederate military lines during the continuance of the civil war.

He took with him the. other two bonds, which were never deposited
at the Farmers' Bank for collection. Whilst he was thus absent
from Alexandria, Ward deposited with the bank to his credit, at
different times between Jtne 1861 and April 1862, various sums
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in notes of different banks of Virginia, the nominal amount of
which exceeded by several thousand dollars the balance due on
the first bond. These notes were at a discount at the times they
were deposited, varjing from eleven to twenty-three per cent.
The cashier of the bank endorsed the several sums thus received
as credits on the first bond; but he testifies that he made the
endorsement without the knowledge or request of the plaintiff. It
was not until June 1865 that the plaintiff Smith was informed
of the deposits to his credit, and he at once refused to sanction
the transaction and accept the deposits, and gave notice to the
cashier of the bank and the defendants of his refusal. The
cashier thereupon erased the endorsements made by him on the
bond.
The defendants (plaintiffs in error) claimed that they were entitled to have the amounts thus deposited and endorsed credited to
them on the bonds, and allowed as a set-off to the demand-of the
plaintiff. They made this claim upon these grounds: That by the
provision in the bonds, making them payable at the Farmers'
Bank, in Alexandria, the parties contracted that the bonds should
be deposited there for collection either before or at maturity; that
the bank was thereby constituted-whether the instruments were
or were not deposited with it-the agent of the plaintiff for their
oollection; and that as such agent it could receive in payment
equally with gold and silver the notes of any banks, -whether circulating at par or below par, and discharge the obligors.
A. U. Browne and

R. J. .

. W. Brune, for plaintiffs in error.

L. Brent, for defendants in error.

FIELD, J. [after reciting the facts].-It is ndoubtedly true
that the designation of.the place of payment in the bonds imported
a stipulation that their holder should have them at the bank when
due to receive payment, and that the obligors w6uld produce there
the funds to pay them. It was inserted for the mutual convenience of the parties. And it is the general usage in such cases for
the holder of the instrument to lodge it with the bank for collection, and the party bound for its payment can call there and take
it up. If the instrument be not there lodged, and the obligor is
there at its maturity with the necessary funds to pay it, he so far
satisfies the contract that he cannot be made responsible for any
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future damages, either as costs of suit or interest, for delay.
When the instrument is lodged with the bank for collection, the
bank becomes the agent of the payee or obligee to receive payment.
The agency extends no further, and without special
authority an agent can only receive payment of the debt due his
principal in the legal currency of the country, or in bills which
pass as money at their par value by the common consent of the
community. In the case at bar, only one bond was deposited with
the Farmers' Bank. That institution, therefore, was only agent
of the payee for its collection. It had no authority to receive
payment of'the other bonds for him or on his account. Whatever
it may have received from the obligors to be applied on the other
bonds, it received as their agent, not as the agent of the obligee.
If the notes have depreciated since in its possession, the loss must
be adjusted between the bank and the depositors; it cannot fall
upon the holder of the bonds.
But even as agent of the payee of the first bond, the bank was
not authorized to receive in its payment depreciated notes of the
banks of Virginia. The fact that those notes constituted the
principal currency in which the ordinary transactions of business
were conducted in Alexandria, cannot alter the law. The notes
were not a legal tender for the debt, nor could they have been
sold for the amount due in legal currency. The doctrine that
bank bills are a good tender unless objected to at the time, on the
ground that they are not money, only applies to current bills,
which are redeemed at the counter of the bank on presentation,
and pass at par value in business transactions at the place where
offered. Notes not thus current at their par value, nor redeemable
on presentation, are not a good tender to principal or agent,
whether they are objected to at the time or not.
In Ontario Bank v. Lightbody, 13 Wend. 105, it was held that
the payment of a check in the bill of a bank which had previously
suspended was not a satisfaction of the debt, though the suspension was unknown by either of the parties, and the bill was current at the time, the court observing that the bills of banks could
only be considered and treated as money so long as they are
redeemed by the bank in specie.
That the power of a collecting agent by the general law is limited to receiving for the debt of his principal that which the law
declares to be a legal tender, or which is by common consent con-
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sidered and treated as money, and passes as such at par, is established by all the authorities. The only condition they impose
upon the principal is, that he shall inform the debtor that he
refuses to sanction the unauthorized transaction of his agent within
a reasonable period after it is brought to his knowledge: Story
on Prom. Notes, §§ 115, 889; Gray]don v. Patterson,13 Iowa
256; Ward v. Evans, 2 Ld. Raym. 930; Hfoward v. Chapman,
4 Carr. & Payne 508.
The objection that the bond did not draw interest pending the
civil war is not tenable. The defendant, Ward, who purchased
the land, was the principal debtor, and he resided within the lines
of the Union forces, and the bonds were there payable. It is not
necessary to consider here whether the rule that interest is not
recoverable on debts between alien enemies during war of their
respective countries, is applicable to debts between citizens of
states in rebellion and citizens of states adhering to the National
Government in the late civil war. That rule can only apply when
the money is to be paid to the belligerent directly. When an
agent appointed to receive the money resides within the same
jurisdiction with the debtor, the latter cannot justify his refusal
to pay the demand, and, of course, the interest which it bears.
It does not follow that the agent, if he receives the money, will
violate the law by remitting it to his alien principal. "The rule,"
says Mr. Justice WASHINGTON, in Conn v. Penn, 1 Peters C. 0.
R. 496, "can never apply in cases where a creditor, although a
subject of the enemy, remains in the country of the debtor, or
has a known agent there authorized to receive the debt, because
the payment to such creditor or his agent could in no respect be
construed into a violation of the duties imposed by a state of war
upon the debtor. The payment in such cases is not made to an
enemy, and it is no objection that the agent may possibly remit
the money to his principal. If he should do so, the offence is
imputable to him, and not to the person paying him the money ;"
Dennistonv. Imbrie, 4 Wash. C. 0. 895. Nor can the rule apply
when one of several joint debtors resides within the same country
with the creditor, or with the known agent of the creditor. It was
so held in Paulv. Ohristie, 4 Harris & MlcHenry's Rep. 161.
Here the principal debtor resided, and the agent of the creditor
for the collection of the first bond was situated within the Federal
lines and jurisdiction. No rule respecting intercourse with the
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enemy could apply as between Marbury, the cashier of the bank
at Alexandria, and Ward, the principal debtor residing at the
same place.
The principal debtor being within the Union lines, could have
protected himself against the running of interest on the other two
bonds, by attending on their maturity at the bank, where they
were made payable, with the funds necessary to pay them. If the
creditor within the Confederate lines had not in that event an
agent present' to receive payment and surrender the bonds, he
would have lost the right to claim subsequent interest.
Judgment affirmed.

United States Circuit Court. District of Virginia.
EX PARTE CESAR GRIFFIN.
Where a person was regularly indicted, convicted, and sentenced under proceedings in" a court of competent jurisdiction, the fact that the judge who presided at
the trial and passed sentence was within". the class prohibited from holding office
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, does not
make the sentence a nullity nor entitle tle prisoner to a discharge on habeascorpus.
The"third section of the fourteenth amendment'did not by its own direct and immediate effect, remove from office persons lawfully appointed or elected before its
passage, though they may have been ineligible to hold such office under the prohibition of the amendment. Legislation by Congress was necessary to give effect to
the prohibition by providing for removal.
The exercise of their official functions by these officers until removed in pursuance of such legislation is lawful and valid.,
The government of Virginia formed at Wheeling by the loyal citizens of the
state after the passage of the ordinance of secession by the convention at Richmond,
having been recognised by the executive and legislative departments of the national
government, must be treated by the courts of the United States as the lawful government of the state.

THIS was an appeal from an order of discharge from imprisonment
made by the district judge, acting as a judge of the Circuit Court, upon
a writ of habeas corpus, allowed upon the petition of Cmsar Griffin.
L. H. Chandler and C. S. Bundy, for petitioner.
Bradley T. Johnsoz. and James Areeson, contr'.
CnAsE, C. J.-The petition alleged unlawful restraint of the petitioner, in violation of the Constitution of the United States, by the
sheriff of Rockbridge county, Virginia, in -virtue of a pretended judg-
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ment rendered in the Circuit Court of that county by Hugh W.
Sheffey, present and presiding therein as judge, though disabled from
holding any office whatever by the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
Upon this petition a writ of habeas corpus was allowed and served,
and the body of the petitioner, with a return showing the cause of
detention, was produced by the sheriff, in conformity with its command.
The general facts of the case, as shown to the district judge, may be
briefly stated as follows:The Circuit Court of Rockbridge county is a Court of Record of the
state of Virginia, having civil and criminal jurisdiction. In this court,
the petitioner, Cmsar Griffin, indicted in the County Court for shooting,
with intent to kill, was regularly tried, in pursuance of his own election; and, having been convicted, was sentenced according to the finding of the jury, to imprisonment for two years, and was in the custody
of the sheriff to be conveyed io the penitentiary, in pursuance of this
sentence.
Griffin is a colored man; but' there was no allegation that the trial
was not fairly conducted, or that any discrimination was made against
him, either in indictment, trial, or sentence, on account of color.
It was not claimed that the grand jury, by which he was indicted,
or the petit jury, by which he was tried, was not, in all respects, lawful and competent. Nor was it alleged that Hugh W. Sheffey, the
judge who presided at the trial, and pronounced the sentence, did not
conduct the trial with fairness and uprightness.
One of the 'counsel for the petitioner, indeed, upon the hearing in
this court, pronounced an eulogium upon his character, both as a man
and as a magistrate, to deserve which might well be the honorable
aspiration of any judge.
But it was alleged and was admitted that Judge Sheffey, in December 1849, as a member of the Virginia House of Delegates, took an
oath to support the Constitution of the United States, and, also, that he
was a member of the legislature of Virginia in 1862, during the late
rebellion, and as such voted for measures to sustain the so-called Confederate States in their war against the United States; and it was
claimed in behalf of the petitioner, that he thereby became, and was at
the time of the trial of the petitioner, disqualified to hold any office,
civil or military, under the United States, or under any state; and it
was specially insisted that the petitioner was entitled to his discharge
upon the ground of the incapacity of Sheffey, under the fourteenth
amendment, to act as judge and pass sentence of imprisonment.
. Upon this showing and argument, it was held by the district judge
that-the sentence of Cmsar Griffin was absolutely null; that his imprisonment was in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and
an order for his discharge from custody was made accordingly.
The general question to be determined on the appeal from this order
is whether or not the sentence of the Circuit Court of Rockbridge
county must be regarded as a nullity, because of the disability to hold
any office under the state of Virginia, imposed by the fourteenth amendment, on the person who, in fact, presided as judge in. that court.
It may be properly borne in mind that the disqualification did not
exist at the time that Sheffey became judge.
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When the functionaries of the state government, existing in Virginia
at the commencement of the late civil war, took part, together with a
majority of the citizens of the state, in rebellion against the government
of the United States, they ceased to constitute a state government for
the state of Virginia which could be recognised as such by the
national government. Their example of hostility to the Union, however, was not followed throughout the state. In many counties, the
local authorities and majorities of the people adhered to the national
government; and representatives from these counties soon after assembled in convention at Wheeling, and organized a government for the
state. This government was recognised as the lawful government of
Virginia by the' executive and legislative departments of the national
government; and this recognition was conclusive upon the judicial
department.
The government of the state thus recognised was in contemplation
ot law, the government of the whole state of Virginia; though excluded,
as the government of the United States was itself excluded, from the
greater portion of the territory of the state. It was the legislature of
the reorganized state which gave the consent of Virginia to the formation of the state of West Virginia. To the formation of that state, the
consent of its own legislature, and of the legislature of the state of Virginia, and of Congress, was indispensable. If either had been wanting,
no state, within the limits of the old, could have been constitutionally
formed: and it is clear that if the government instituted at Wheeling
was not the government of the whole state of Virginia, no new state has
ever been constitutionally formed within her ancient boundaries.
It cannot admit of question, then, that the government which consented to the formation of the state of West Virginia, remained in all
national relations the government of Virginia, although that event
reduced to very narrow limits the territory acknowledging its jurisdiction, and not controlled by insurgent force. Indeed, it is well known
historically that the state and the government of Virginia, thus organized, was recognised by the national government. Senators and representatives from the state occupied seats in Congress, and when the
insurgent force which held possession of the principal part of the territory, was overcome, and the governmenC recognised by the United States
was transferred from Alexandria to Richmond, it became in fact, what
it was before in law, the government of the whole state. As such it
was entitled, under the Constitution, to the same recognition and respect,
in national relations, as the government of any other state.
It was under this government that Hugh W. Sheffey was, on the 22d
February 1866, duly appointed judge of the Circuit Court of Rockbridge county, and he was in the regular exercise of his functions as
such when Griffin was tried and sentenced.
More than two years had elapsed, after the date of his appointment,
when the ratification of the fourteenth amendment by the requisite
number of states was officially promulgated by the Secretary of State on
the 28th of July 1868.
That amendment, in-its third section, ordains that "no person shall
be a senator or representative in Congress, or elector of President and
Vice-President, or hold Any office, civil or military, under the United
States, or under any state, who, having previously taken an oath as a
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member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any state legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any
state, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have
engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or
comfort to the enemies thereof."
And it is admitted that the office held by Judge Sheffey, at the time
of the trial of Griffin, was an office under the state of Virginia, and that
he was one of the persons to whom the prohibition to hold office pronounced by the amendment applied.
The question to be considered, therefore, is whether, upon a sound
construction of the amendment, it must be regarded as operating directly,
without any intermediate proceeding whatever, upon all persons within
the category of prohibition, and as depriving them at once and absolutely of all official authority and power.
One of the counsel for the petitioner suggested that the amendment
must be construed with reference to the Act of 1867, which extends
the writ of habeas corpus to a large class of cases in which the previous
legislation did not allow it to be issued. And it is proper to say a few
words of this suggestion here.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 expressly denied the benefit of the writ
of habeas corpus to prisoners not confined, under or by color of the
authority of the United States. Under that act, no person confined
under state authority could have the benefit of the writ. Afterwards,
in 1833 and 1842, the writ was extended to certain cases, specially
described, of imprisonment under state process; and, in 1867, by the
act to which the counsel referred, the writ was still further extended
"to all cases where any person may be restrained bf liberty in violation
of the Constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States."
And the learned counsel was, doubtless, correct in maintaining that
without the Act of 1867 there would be no remedy by habeas corpus in
the case of the petitioner, nor, indeed, in any case of imprisonment in
violation of the Constitution of the United States, except in the possible
case of an imprisonment not only within the provisions of this act, but
also within the provisions of some one of the previous Acts of 1789,
1833, and 1842.
But if, in saying that the amendment must be construed with reference to the act, the counsel meant to affirm that the existence of the act
throws any light whatever upon the construction of the amendment, the
court is unable to perceive the force of his observation.
It is not pretended that imprisonment for shooting with intent to kill
is unconstitutional, and it will hardly be affirmed that the Act of 1867
throws any light whatever upon the question whether such imprisonment'in any particular case is unconstitutional. The case of unconstitutional imprisonment must be established by appropriate evidence. It cannot be inferred from the existence of a remedy for such a case. And,
surely, no construction, otherwise unwarranted, can be put upon the
amendment more than upon any other provision of the Constitution, to
make a case of violation out of abts which, otherwise, must be regarded
as not only constitutional, but right.
We come then to the question of construction. What was the intention of the people of the United States in adopting the fourteenth

EX PARTE GRIFFIN.

amendment ? What is the true scope and purpose of the prohibition to
hold office contained in the third section?
The proposition maintained in behalf of the petitioner, is that this
prohibition, instantly, on the day of its promulgation, vacated all offices
held by persons within the category of prohibition, and made all official
acts performed by them since that day null and void.
One of the counsel sought to vindicate this construction of the amendment upon the ground that the definitions of the verb "to hold," given
by Webster in his dictionary, are "-to stop ; to confine; to restrain from
escape; to keep fast; to retain;" of which definitions, the author says
that "to hold rarely or never signifies the first act of seizing or falling
on, but the act of retaining a thing when seized on or confined."
The other counsel seemed to be embarrassed by the difficulties of this
literal construction, and sought to establish a distinction between sentences in criminal cases, and judgments and decrees in civil cases. He
admitted, indeed, that the latter might be valid when made by a court
held by a judge within the prohibitive category of the amendment; but
insisted that the sentences of the same court in criminal cases must be
treated as nullities. The ground of the distinction, if we correctly
apprehend the argument, was found in the circumstance that the Act
of 1867 provided a summary redress in the latter class of cases; while
in the former, no summary remedy could be had, and great inconvenience would arise from regarding decrees and judgments as utterly null
and without effect.
But this ground of distinction seems to the court unsubstantial. It
rests upon the fallacy already commented on. The amendment makes
no such distinction as is supposed. It does not deal with cases, but
with persons. The prohibition is general. No person in the prohibitive category can hold office. It applies to all persons and to all offices
under the United States, or any state. If upon a true construction, it
operates as a removal of a judge, and avoids all sentences in criminal
cases, pronounced by him after the promulgation of the amendment, it
must be held to have the effect of removing all judges and all officers,
and annulling all their official acts after that date.
The literal construction, therefore, is the only one upon which the
order of the learned district judge, discharging the prisoner, can be sustained; and was indeed, as appears from his certificate, the construction upon which the order was -made. He says expressly "the right of
the petitioner to his discharge appeared to me to rest solely on the incapacity of the said Hugh W. Sheffey to act (that is, as judge), and so to
sentence the prisoner, under the fourteenth amendment."
Was this a correct construction?
In the examination of questions of this sort, gteat attention is properly
paid to the argument from inconvenience. This argument, it is true,
cannot prevail over plain words or clear reason. But, on the other
hand, a construction, which must necessarily occasion great public and
private mischief, must never be preferred to a construction which will
occasion neither, or neither in so great *degree, unless the terms of the
instrument absolutely require such preference.
Let it then be considered what consequences would spring from the
literal interpretation contended for in behalf of the petitioner.
The amendment applies to all the states of the Union, to all offices
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under the United States or under any state, and to all persons in the
category of prohibition, and for all time present and future. The
offences, for which exclusion from office is denounced, are not merely
engaging in insurrection or rebellion against the United States, but the
giving of aid or comfort to their enemies. They are offences not only
of civil, but of foreign, war.
Now, let it be supposed that some of the persons, described in the third
section, during the war with Mexico, gave aid and comfort to the enemies of their country, and, nevertheless, held some office on the 28th
of July 1868, or subsequently.
Is it a reasonable construction of the amendment which will make it
annul every official act of such an officer?
But, let another view be taken. It is well known that many persons,
engaged in the late rebellion, have emigrated to states which adhered to
the national government, and it is not to be doubted that not a few
among them, as members of Congress, or officers of the United States,
or as members of state legislatures, or as executive or judicial officers
of a state, had before the war taken an oath to support the Constitution
of the United States. In their new homes, capacity, integrity, fitness,
and acceptability, may very possibly have been more looked to than
antecedents. Probably some of these persohs have been elected to office
in the states which have received them. It is not unlikely that some
of them held office on the 28th July 1868. Must all their official acts
be held to be null under the inexorable exigencies of the amendment?
But the principal intent of the amendment was, doubtless, to provide
for the exclusion from office, in the lately insurgent states, of all persons within the prohibitive description.
Now, it is well known that before the amendment was proposed by
Congress, governments acknowledging the constitutional supremacy of
the national government had been organized in all these states. In
some these governments had been organized through the direct action
of the people, encouraged and supported by the President, as in Tennessee, Louisiana, and Arkansas, and in some through similar action in pursuance of executive proclamations, as in North Carolina, Alabama, and
several other states. *InVirginia such a state government had' been
organized as has been already stated, soon after the commencement of
the war; and this government had been fully recognised by Congress,
as well as by the President.
This government, indeed, and all the others, except that of Tennessee, were declared by Congress to be provisional only.
But, in all these states all offices had been filled 7 before the ratification.of the amendment, by citizens, who, at the time of the ratification,
were actively engaged in the performance of their several duties. Very
many, if not a majority of these officers, had, im one or another of the
capacities described in the third section, taken an oath to support the
Constitution, and had afterwards engaged in the late rebellion; and
most if not all of them continued in the discharge of their functions
after the promulgation of the amendment, not supposing that by its
operation their offices could be vacated without some action of Congress.
If the construction now contended for be given to the prohibitive
section, the effect must be to annul all official acts performed by these
officers. No sentence, no judgment , no decree, no acknowledgment of a
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deed, no record of a deed, no sheriff's or commissioner's sale-in short,
no official act-is of the least validity. It is impossible to measure the
evils which such a construction would add to the calamities which have
already fallen upon the people of these states.
The argument from inconveniences, great as these, against the construction contended for, is certainly one of no light weight.
But there is another principle, which, in determining the construction of this amendment, is entitled to equal consideration with that
which has just been stated and illustrated. It maybe stated thus : Of
two constructions, either of which is warranted by the words of an
amendment of a, public act, that is to be preferred which best harmonizes the amendment with the general tenor and spirit of the act
amended.
This principle forbids a construction of the amendment, not clearly
required by its terms, which will bring it into conflict or discord with
the other provisions of the Constitution.
And here it becomes proper to examine somewhat more particularly
the character of the third section of the amendment.
The amendment itself was the first of the series of measures proposed
or adopted by Congress with a view to the reorganization of state governments acknowledging the constitutional supremacy of the national
government, in those states which had attempted to break up their constitutional relations with the Union, and to establish an independent
confederacy.
All citizens who had, during its earlier stages, engaged in or aided
the war against the United States, which resulted inevitably from this
attempt, had incurred the penalties of treason under the statute of
1790.
But, by the Act of July 17th 1862, while the civil war was flagrant,
the death penalty for treason, committed by engaging in rebellion, was
practically abolished. Afterwards, in December 1863, full amnesty, qu
conditions which now certainly seem to be moderate, was offered by
President Lincold in accordance with the same Act of Congress; and
after organized resistance to the United States had ceased, amnesty was
again offered, in accordance with the same act, by President Johnson,
in May 1865. In both these offers of amnesty extensive exceptions
were made.
In June 1866, little more than a year later, the fourteenth amendment was proposed; and was ratified in July 1868. The only punitive
section contained in it is the third, now under consideration. It is not
improbable that one of the objects of this section was to provide for the
security of the nation and of individuals by the exclusion of a class of
citizens from office; but it can hardly be doubted that its main purpose
was to inflict upon the leading and most influential characters who had
been engaged in the rebellion, exclusion from office as a punishment
for the offence.
It is true that, in the judgment of some enlightened jurists, its legal
effect was to remit all other punishment. And such certainly was its
practical effect, for it led to the general amnesty of December 25th, of
the same year, and to the order discontinuing all prosecutions for crime,
and proceedings for confiscation originating in the rebellion. But this
very effect shows distinctly its punitive character.
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Now it is undoubted that those provisions of the Constitution which
deny to the legislature power to deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, or to pass a bill of attainder or an
exPostfacto law, are inconsistent in their spirit and general purpose
with a provision which, at once, without trial, deprives a whole class of
persons of offices held by them, for any cause, however grave. It is
true that no limit can be imposed on the people when exercising their
sovereign power in amending their own constitution of government.
But it is a necessary presumption that the people, in the exercise of.
that power, seek to confirm and improve rather than to weaken and impair the general spirit of the Constitution.
If there were no other grounds than these for seeking another inter-

pretation of the amendment than that which we are asked to put upon
it, this court would feel itself bound to hold them sufficient.
But there is another and sufficient ground, and it is this, that the
construction demanded in behalf of the petitioner is nugatory except
for mischief.
In the language of one of the counsel, "the object had in view by us
is not to unseat Hugh W. Sheffey, and no judgment of the court can
effect that."
Now the object of the amendment is to unseat every officer, whether
judicial or executive, who holds civil or military office in contravention
of the terms of the amendment. Surely, a construction which fails to
accomplish the main purpose of the amendment and yet necessarily
works the misehiefs and inconveniences which have been described, and
is repugnant to the first principles of justice and rigbt embodied in other
provisions of the Constitution, is not to be favored, if any other reasonable construction can be found.
Is there, then, any other reasonable construction? In the judgment of
the court there is another, not only reasonable, but very clearly warranted
by the terms of the amendment, and recognised by the*legislation of
Congress.
The object of the amendment is to exclude from certain offices a certain class of persons. Now, it is obviously impossible to do this by a
simple declaration, whether in the Constitution or in an Act of Congress,
that all persons included within a particular description shall not hold
office. For, in the very nature of things, it must be ascertained what
particular individuals are embraced by the definition before any sentence
of exclusion can be made to operate. To accomplish this ascertainment
and insure effective results, proceedings, evidence, decisions, and enforcement of decisions, more or less formal, are indispensable; and these
can only be- provided for by Congress.
Now, the necessity of this is recognised by the aniendment itself, in
its fifth and final section, which declares that "Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article!'
There are, indeed, other sections than the third, to the enforcement
of which legislation is necessary; but there is no one which more clearly
requires legislation ir order to give effect to it. The fifth section qualifies the third to the same extent as it would if the whole amendment
consisted of these two sections.
And the final clause of the third section itself is significant. It gives
to Congress absolute control of the whole operation of the amendment.
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These are its words: "But Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of
each house, remove such disability." Taking the third section then in
its completeness, with this final clause, it seems to put beyond reasonable question the conclusion that the intention of the people of the
United States, in adopting the fourteenth amendment, was to create a
disability, to be removed in proper cases by a two-thirds vote, and to be
made operative in other cases by the legislation of Congress in its ordinary course. This construction gives certain effect to the undoubted
intent of the amendment to insure the exclusion from office of the
designated class of persons, if not relieved from their disabilities, and
avoids the maijifold evils which must attend the construction insisted
upon by the counsel for the petitioner.
It results from this examination that persons in office by lawful
4ppointment, or election, before the promulgation of the fourteenth
amendment, are, not removed therefrom by the direct and immediate
effect of the prohibition to hold office contained in the third section;
but that legislation by Congress is necessary to give effect to the prohibition, by providing for such removal. And it results further that the
exercise of their several functions by these officers, until removed in
pursuance of such legislation, is not unlawful.
The views which have been just stated receive strong confirmation
from the action of Congress and of the executive department of the
government. The decision of the district judge, now under revision,
was made in December 1868, and two months afterwards, in February
1869, Congress adopted a joint resolution entitled "A resolution respecting the provisional governments of Virginia and Texas." In this resolution it was provided that persons "holding office in the provisional
governments of Virginia and Texas," but u"able to take and subscribe
the test oath prescribed by the Act of July2d 1862, except those relieved from disability, "be removed therefrom;" but a provision wzs
added, suspending the operation of the resolution for thirty days from
its passage. The joint resolution was passed and received by the President on the 6th of February, and not having been returned in ten days,
became a law without his approval.
It cannot be doubted that this joint resolution recognised persons
unable to take the oath required, to which class belonged all persons
within the description of the third secfion of the fourteenth amendment, as holding office in Virginia at the date of its passage, and provided for their removal from office.
It is not clear whether it was the intent of Congress that this removal should be effected in Virginia by the force of the joint resolution
itself, or by the commander of the first military district. It was understood by the executive or military authorities as directing the removal
of the persons described, by military order. The resolution was published by command of the general of the army for the infbrmation of all
concerned, on the 22d of March 1869. It had been previously published by direction of the commander of the first military district,
accompanied by an oraer, to take effect on 18th of March 1869, removing the persons described from office. The date at which this order
was to take effect was afterwards changed to the 21st of March.
It is plain enough from this statement that persons holding office in
Virginia, and within the prohibition of the fourteenth amendment, were
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not regarded by Congress, or by the military authority, in Iarch 1869,
as having been already removed from office.
It is unnecessary to discuss here the question whether the government of Virginia, which seems to have-been not provisional, but permanent, when transferred from Alexandria to Richmond, became provisional under the subsequent legislation of Congress, or to express any
opinion concerning the validity of the joint resolution, or of the proceedings under it. The resolution and proceedings are referred to here
only for the purpose of showing that the amendment had not been regarded by Congress or the executive, so far as represented by the military authorities, as effecting an immediate removal of the officers
described in the third section.
After the most careful consideration, therefore, I find myself constrained to the conclusion that Hugh W. Sheffey had not been removed
from the office of judge at the time of the trial and sentence of the petitioner; and that the sentence of the Circuit Court of Rockbridge county
was lawful.
In this view of the case, it becomes unnecessary to determine the
question relating to the effect of the sentence of a judge defacto exercising the office with the color, but without the substance, of right. It
is proper to say, however, that I should have no difficulty in sustaining
the custody of the sheriff, under the sentence of a court held by such a
judge.
Instructive argument and illustratiol of this branch of the case might
be derived from an examination of those provisions of the Constitution
ordaining that no person shall be a Representative, or Senator, or President, or Vice-President, unless having certain prescribed qualifications.
These provisions, as well as those which ordain that no senator or representative shall, during his term of service, be appointed to any office
under the United States, under certain circumstances, and that no person holding any such office shall, while holding such office, be a member of either house, operate on the capacity to take office. The election
or appointment itself is prohibited and invalidated; and yet no instance
is believed to exist where a: person has been actually elected, and has
actually taken the office, notwithstanding the prohibition, and his acts,
while exercising its functions, have been held invalid.
But it is unnecessary to pursue the examination. The cases cited by
counsel cover the whole ground, both of principle and authority.'
This subject received the consideration of the judges of the Supreme
Court at the last term with reference to this and kindred cases in this
district, and I am authorized to saythat they unanimously concur in
the opinion that a person convicted by a jury, and s.entenced in a court
held by a judge de facto, acting under color of office, though not dejure,
and detained in custody in. pursuance of his sentence, cannot be properly discharged upon habeas corpus.
It follows that the order of the district judge must be reversed, and
that the petitioner must be remanded to the custody of the sheriff of
Rockbridge county.
I Taylor v. Skinner, 2 So. Ca. 696 ; State v. Bloom, 17 Wis. 521 ; Ex rel
Ballon v. Bangs, 24 Ill. 184.
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The damages ordinarily recoverable for breach of contract are those necessarily
following the breach which the derelict party must.be presumed to know would be
the probable consequence of his failure.
The failure of an engine builder to furnish at a fixed time, according to contract,
to a coal company a suitable engine for transporting their coal, entitles them to
damages for their expenses in such transportation, with the means they had, or
the best they could procure during the period of delay, beyond what they would
have incurred with the engine.
But they cannot claim also for the profits in the transportation by engine of the
extra quantity of coal they might have transported by it in the same period-it not
being fairly inferable that the builder would know that its possession would enable
them to -mine more coal, and also to haul more.
An interested witness cannot be offered to purge himself of his interest by his
own voire dire.

Corporation books do not prove themselves : proof of their true character must
be given to authorize their reception in evidence.
At the time of offering evidence some competent purpose should be stated as the
ground for its reception, if it be not obviously competent on its face.
ERROR to the District Court of Allegheny county.

J. H. Bailey, for plaintiffs in error.
02 B. Smith, contrh.
The opinion of.the court was delivered by
AGNEW, J.-The only question we need discuss in this case is that
relating to the measure -of damages. The defendants below offered in
substance to prove the difference in the expense of transporting the coal
carried on their railroad, between horse or mule power and steam.power,
and for this purpose to prove how much coal was actually carried over

their railroad between the 1st day of February-the time for the delivery of the engine under the contract-and the day when the engine

was actually put in running order on the road; claiming that this difference of expense was a loss directly occasioned, by the failure to finish
and deliver the engine in time.

The learned judge overruled this offer, being of opinion that the measure of damages for the delay was the ordinary hire of a locomotive
during the period of the delay. We think that under the circumstances
of the case, this was an error.

It was in proof, and was also a part of

the offer, that the only means the defendants had of transporting their
coal was by horses and mules, and it also appeared in the evidence that
owing to the gauge of the railroad track and the kind of engine required
for their use, it was impossible to have procured for hire an engine to
suit their purpose, and that the hire of such an engine was purely a
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speculative, and not a practical question, owing to the fact that the
witnesses knew of none such to be had.
The true inquiry which arose under these circumstances, was whether
the damages thus claimed were the necessary consequence of the failure
to perform the contract in time, and whether they were presumptively
within the view of the plaintiffs at the time of making their contract to
finish and deliver the engine in running order on the defendants' track
by the 1st of February. The damages ordinarily recoverable are those
necessarily following the breach, which the party guilty of the breach
must be presumed to know would be the probable consequence of his
failure: 2 Greenl. Ev. § 253. This rule is well expressed by STRONG,
J., in Adams Express Co. v. Egbert, 12 Casey 864. They must be a
proximate consequence of the breach, not merely remote or possible.
There is no measure for losses of the latter kind. "But on the other
hand," he remarks, "the loss of profits or advantages, which must have
resulted from a fulfilment of the contract, may be compensated in damages, when they are the direct and immediate fruits of the contract, and
must therefore have been stipulated for, and have been in the contemplation of the parties when it was made."
This statement of the rule is quoted with approbation by THOmPsoN,
J., in Fassler v. Love, 12 Wright 410-11. The subject is also discussed at large by myself in .leming v. Beck, Id. 312-13, and the same
rule in substance quoted from Hadlej v. Baxendale, 9 Exeh. 341 (Wels.
Hurlst. & Gordon).
That the loss in this case was immediate, and the necessary consequence of non-fulfiment, is obvious. The coal company was by the contract to have a finished locomotive adapted to their railroad put in thorough running order upon their track by the 1st day of February.
The direct consequence of not getting it was, that they were obliged to
continue transporting their coal as before, by homes and mules, until the
engine was put there. It is quite as clear also, that this consequence
must have been in full view of Foster & Co. when they entered into
the contkact. The instrument evidencing the agreement was a proposition of Foster & Co. accepted by the president of the coal company.
It was directed to James M. Bailey, President of the Pittsburgh Coal
Company, and proposed to build a locomotive engine to fit a forty inch
track. It was to be built in a workmanlike manner, of the best material, and finished by the 1st day of February then next, and "put in
thorough running order on your track on or before that day."
The price, $5500, was to be paid to wit: $1500 on the 16th day of
January, "and the balance when the engine is completed and running
on your road." Thus the proposition to build the engine shows very
clearly that Foster & Co. knew that it was to be usd in running on a
coal railroad, and upon a track of unusual gauge, and the proof shows
that at the time of the making of the contract, engines of the size and
character of the one described in the proposition, were not in ordinary
use and could not be hired. From the nature of the circumstances
Foster & Co., as engine builders, must have known that if they failed
to deliver the engine on the track by the day agreed upon, the coal company would be forced to continue transporting their coal by their former
means, and consequently would suffer a loss in the difference of expense
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But for the error as to the true measure of the damages
must be reversed.
Judgment reversed, and a venirefacias de nova awarded.

